England was leaning upon the Russian
side against Germany. The most important in the minor details in this
new policy, the one which has had most effect perhaps in producing the
war, was an understanding whereby the French fleet should virtually
evacuate the Northern Seas and undertake for England the policing of the
Mediterranean trade routes, and the guardianship of that source of food
supply to Great Britain, thus leaving the whole weight of the British
Navy free to guard the North Sea, and to face the new and growing German
naval force.
Now, it must always be borne in mind that these arrangements, large and
small, detailed and general, whereby Great Britain gradually involved
herself in a network of French and Russian supports and reciprocal
duties, never took the form of an alliance. The utmost pains were taken
by English diplomatists and permanent officials at the English Foreign
Office, experts and servants, to state that England remained free in
spite of all to act as her conscience or her interest might dictate,
whenever, or if, war should break out between the two groups of
Continental powers. No one can read the conflict of evidence between the
German Ambassador and Sir Edward Grey in the highly typical telephone
incident which took place immediately before the recent declaration of
war without seeing that liberty of action was maintained by the
Government of Great Britain until the very last moment.
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