That empire would indeed have been more foolish even than cowardly had
it listened to any such proposals. The position, therefore, was one of
inevitable and increasing friction. It was a matter of life and death to
England that no other great Western fleet should exist besides the
French, and it was a matter of national existence to Germany once she
had undertaken a policy not to give up that policy at the dictation of
any other power--for, among other things, modern Germany lived on
prestige; her whole internal structure depended upon it, and for Prussia
to lose faith before Europe would be the end of the Germany that Prussia
had made.
There are those who say that a Germany conducted by some Richelieu, or
even by a surviving Bismarck, would never have attempted the building of
a great fleet until accounts had been finally settled with France. There
are those who say that the elements of statesmanship required the German
Empire first to settle herself politically upon the shores of the
Straits of Dover and the Netherlands, first to destroy the danger of a
great war in the west on land, then and then only to begin building that
fleet which must inevitably challenge Great Britain. It is no part of
this criticism to consider the statesmanship of another nation, but at
any rate once the policy of building the fleet was begun conflict with
England was in sight.
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