The fixed cardinal point for English policy upon which no English
patriot worthy of the name would hesitate for a moment, and which no
historian with any sense of justice can condemn, to wit, that no one, if
England can help it, shall have naval predominance over the British
fleet, particularly in the narrow seas.
2. The effect of certain undertakings, a whole network of diplomatic
actions, particularly in connection with France, engaged in by the
English Foreign Office during the last ten years.
3. A certain vague attachment to the Western, or Latin, tradition of
civilization with its routine of conventions in war and peace, and
particularly of treaties as between first-class powers. This tradition
was still sufficiently strong to act as a motive converging with the two
others mentioned above to produce a sufficient moral stream in favor of
war as, though sluggish, to help to turn the scale.
I say that these three things combined, upon the whole and doubtfully,
discovered a sufficient strength between them to make the English
politicians, after serious hesitation and close division, determine upon
war.
Let me take them in their order:
1. The cardinal point of statesmanship upon which all English foreign
policy has turned for two hundred years, that no one shall be more
powerful at sea than England, especially upon the shores of the narrow
seas, appears to foreigners unarguably arrogant.
Pages:
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339