What I believe
possible was that the growing power of Germany and the growing danger of
war could be made to compel England to perceive that this old principle
was untenable and unpractical, and that a peaceable arrangement with
Germany was preferable, but that dogma always paralyzed the possibility
of an understanding. After the crisis of 1911 public opinion forced
British rulers to a rapprochement toward Germany. By wearisome work an
understanding was finally reached in different disputed questions of
economic interest which related to Africa and Asia Minor. This
understanding should have diminished possible political friction if the
free development of our strength were not impeded. Both peoples had
sufficient space to measure their strength in peaceful competition.
This was the principle always upheld by German policy. But while we were
negotiating England was always thinking of strengthening her relations
with Russia and France. The decisive factor was that more binding
military agreements for the case eventually of a Continental war were
concluded outside the political sphere. England negotiated, if possible,
secretly. If anything leaked out of importance it was minimized in press
and Parliament. It could not be concealed from us. The whole situation
was as follows:
England was willing to come to an understanding with us in individual
questions, but the first principle always was that Germany's free
development of strength must be checked by the balance of power.
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