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Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804

"The Critique of Practical Reason"


{BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 65}

VII. How is it possible to conceive an Extension of Pure
Reason in a Practical point of view, without its
Knowledge as Speculative being enlarged at
the same time?
{BOOK_2|CHAPTER_2 ^paragraph 70}

In order not to be too abstract, we will answer this question at
once in its application to the present case. In order to extend a pure
cognition practically, there must be an a priori purpose given, that
is, an end as object (of the will), which independently of all
theological principle is presented as practically necessary by an
imperative which determines the will directly (a categorical
imperative), and in this case that is the summum bonum. This, however,
is not possible without presupposing three theoretical conceptions
(for which, because they are mere conceptions of pure reason, no
corresponding intuition can be found, nor consequently by the path
of theory any objective reality); namely, freedom, immortality, and
God.


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