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Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804

"The Critique of Practical Reason"

We could not, however, make a similar step as
regards the second dynamical idea, namely, that of a necessary
being. We could not rise to it from the sensible world without the aid
of the first dynamical idea. For if we attempted to do so, we should
have ventured to leave at a bound all that is given to us, and to leap
to that of which nothing is given us that can help us to effect the
connection of such a supersensible being with the world of sense
(since the necessary being would have to be known as given outside
ourselves). On the other hand, it is now obvious that this
connection is quite possible in relation to our own subject,
inasmuch as I know myself to be on the one side as an intelligible
[supersensible] being determined by the moral law (by means of
freedom), and on the other side as acting in the world of sense. It is
the concept of freedom alone that enables us to find the unconditioned
and intelligible for the conditioned and sensible without going out of
ourselves. For it is our own reason that by means of the supreme and
unconditional practical law knows that itself and the being that is
conscious of this law (our own person) belong to the pure world of
understanding, and moreover defines the manner in which, as such, it
can be active.


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