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Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804

"The Critique of Practical Reason"

Now,
the categories are all divided into two classes- the mathematical,
which concern the unity of synthesis in the conception of objects, and
the dynamical, which refer to the unity of synthesis in the conception
of the existence of objects. The former (those of magnitude and
quality) always contain a synthesis of the homogeneous, and it is
not possible to find in this the unconditioned antecedent to what is
given in sensible intuition as conditioned in space and time, as
this would itself have to belong to space and time, and therefore be
again still conditioned. Whence it resulted in the Dialectic of Pure
Theoretic Reason that the opposite methods of attaining the
unconditioned and the totality of the conditions were both wrong.
The categories of the second class (those of causality and of the
necessity of a thing) did not require this homogeneity (of the
conditioned and the condition in synthesis), since here what we have
to explain is not how the intuition is compounded from a manifold in
it, but only how the existence of the conditioned object corresponding
to it is added to the existence of the condition (added, namely, in
the understanding as connected therewith); and in that case it was
allowable to suppose in the supersensible world the unconditioned
antecedent to the altogether conditioned in the world of sense (both
as regards the causal connection and the contingent existence of
things themselves), although this unconditioned remained
indeterminate, and to make the synthesis transcendent.


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