Probably there is not
one here who has not in the course of the day had occasion to set in
motion a complex train of reasoning, of the very same kind, though
differing of course in degree, as that which a scientific man goes
through in tracing the causes of natural phenomena.
A very trivial circumstance will serve to exemplify this. Suppose you
go into a fruiterer's shop, wanting an apple,--you take up one, and, on
biting it, you find it is sour; you look at it, and see that it is hard
and green. You take up another one, and that too is hard, green, and
sour. The shopman offers you a third; but, before biting it, you examine
it, and find that it is hard and green, and you immediately say that you
will not have it, as it must be sour, like those that you have already
tried.
Nothing can be more simple than that, you think; but if you will take
the trouble to analyse and trace out into its logical elements what has
been done by the mind, you will be greatly surprised. In the first place
you have performed the operation of induction. You found that, in
two experiences, hardness and greenness in apples went together with
sourness. It was so in the first case, and it was confirmed by the
second. True, it is a very small basis, but still it is enough to make
an induction from; you generalise the facts, and you expect to find
sourness in apples where you get hardness and greenness.
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