distance of another
300 miles to be traversed before he reached the Ebro, which was designated
as the centre of his operations.
And all this had to be done while a great French army was already pouring
in through the passes of the Pyrenees. No more tremendous, or, it may be
said, impossible, task was ever assigned to an English commander; and to
add to the absurdity of their scheme, the British government sent off Sir
David Baird without instructions, and even without money. The Duke of York
had vainly protested against the plan of the ministry, and had pointed out
that nothing short of an army of 60,000 men, fully equipped with all
necessaries for war--money, transport, and artillery--could achieve
success of any kind.
Upon the day Terence rejoined, news came from the engineers in advance
that the assurances Sir John Moore had received that the road by which the
army was to travel was perfectly practicable for artillery and
baggage-waggons, were wholly false, and it was probable that the artillery
and cavalry would have to make a long circuit to the south.
It was too late now to change the route for the rest of the army. Nearly
half the force had already started on the road to Almeida, and the
supplies for their subsistence had been collected at that town. Therefore
it was necessary that the main body of the infantry should travel by that
road, while three thousand were to act as a guard for the artillery and
cavalry on the other route.
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