I seconded this plan with all my energies. In
vain. I was told (by Berlin) that it would be against the dignity of
Austria. Of course, all that was needed was one hint from Berlin to
Count Berchtold (the Austrian Foreign Minister); he would have satisfied
himself with a diplomatic triumph and rested on the Serbian answer. That
hint was never given. On the contrary, pressure was brought in favor of
war....
After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with our proposal.
We insisted on war. No other answer could I get (from Berlin) than that
it was a colossal condescension on the part of Austria not to
contemplate any acquisition of territory. Sir Edward justly pointed out
that one could reduce a country to vassalage without acquiring
territory; that Russia would see this, and regard it as a humiliation
not to be put up with. The impression grew stronger and stronger that we
were bent on war. Otherwise our attitude toward a question in which we
were not directly concerned was incomprehensible. The insistent requests
and well-defined declarations of M. Sasanof, the Czar's positively
humble telegrams, Sir Edward's repeated proposals, the warnings of
Marquis San Guiliano and of Bollati, my own pressing admonitions were
all of no avail. Berlin remained inflexible--Serbia must be slaughtered.
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